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Russia’s ‘Other Ummah’
From ‘Ethnic Shi’ism’ to 
Ideological Movement?
Bruno De Cordier
Since the beginning of the Syrian War, ties between Russia and the 
Shia sphere are primarily examined in terms of geopolitics, while little 
attention is being paid to the indigenous as well as immigrant Shia 
populations in Russia itself. Since the incorporation, either by annexa-
tion or initial protectorate settlements, of the khanate of Astrakhan in 
1556 as well as of the southern Caspian-Caucasian khanates, the emir-
ate of Bukhara and the highlands of eastern Bukhara in the tsarist 
empire between 1806 and 1896, the Russian space has, nonetheless, 
included a Shia Muslim population. Later absorbed into the USSR, 
where the population of Shia origin and culture reportedly counted 
up to 2.7 million around 1970 (Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay 
1979: 149, 157), parts came to reside in Russia either when it obtained 
its present contours in late 1991 or during different migration move-
ments that took place since.
Who Is Russia’s Shia Population?
Nonofficial estimates of the number of Shia currently living in Russia 
go up to over 2 million. Ja’fari, or Twelver Shi’ism, which is globally 
the largest and mainstream branch of Shi’ism, the majority creed in 
Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan and also the state ideology in Iran, 
is primarily present among the ethnic-Azerbaijani population in Russia. 
Officially counting some 630,000 people according to the federal census 
of 2010 (with some 57,000 living in Moscow and over 130,000 in Dages-
tan), they are partly indigenous communities who lived in Dagestan, 
Moscow and other parts before 1991, or they are permanent residents 
who acquired Russian citizenship since. The size of this population may 
have increased by some 10 per cent since then. Additionally, there are 
the labour migrants and other ‘temporary residents’ from Azerbaijan, 
which reportedly amounted to more than 536,000 in mid-2017, with a 
large presence in the Moscow area as well as in Yekaterinburg.
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So, all together, the Azerbaijani portion of Russian society 
amounts to some 1.16 million. Some two-thirds are believed to 
adhere to Ja’fari Shi’ism by culture and tradition. Hence, Azerbai-
jani form the largest ethno-demographic base of Shi’ism in Rus-
sia and the entire former USSR. Another traditionally Ja’fari Shia 
group are the so-called Middle Asian Iranians from the Samarkand 
area. Forming a compact Shi’ite minority since the late eighteenth 
century, they are now considered an Uzbek subethnic group (Pétric 
2007). It is difficult to pin their numbers because no sectarian or 
subethnic breakdown exist for the reportedly 1.9 million labour 
migrants and temporary residents from Uzbekistan. On the base of 
extrapolations, the size of this population group could range from 
3,000 to 7,000, making it potentially the second-largest group of the 
Ja’fari Shia tradition in Russia.
In Dagestan, apart from the Shia Azerbaijani in and around Derbent, 
some 3,000 Aghul people in the region’s southeast follow Ja’fari Shi’ism 
as well (Topchiev 2014: 5). Remnants of a historically much larger histori-
cal Shia population, their existence briefly attracted attention after murky 
acts of vandalism on a Shia shrine near Derbent. Furthermore, over the 
last ten years or so, a certain number of native Russian citizens from 
Slavic, Turkic and Caucasian origin as well as Tajik labour migrants 
converted to Ja’fari Shi’ism from Sunnism, Christianity or agnosticism 
or atheism under the influence of transnational Ja’fari Shia networks or 
that of Iranian confessional diplomacy. Finally, temporary residents, dip-
lomatic personnel, business and education expatriates, and refugees of 
Shia background or persuasion from Iran, the Arab sphere and Pakistan 
also add to Russia’s Shia population.
The following of Ismaili Shi’ism, which is the second-largest Shia 
denomination in Russia and in the former USSR in general, consists 
mainly of labour migrants from Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan 
region. The size of this population could be 21,000 to 23,000 (Kalan-
darov 2005: 10). Radically different from Ja’fari Shi’ism in terms of 
doctrine, institutions and practice, Ismailism and its adherent base 
remains characterised by the absence of a country where they form a 
majority or deliver the state doctrine. It is characterised by a strong 
identification with the micro-regional languages and genealogies of 
the western Pamir and the upper Panj Valley as well with the West-
ern Europe–based, hereditary Ismaili leadership and its international 
philanthropic network. As such, it is developing along very different 
lines from Ja’fari Shi’ism.
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Ideological Reinvigoration
Regardless of actual practice and active sectarian consciousness, 
Russia’s roughly 780,000 Ja’fari Shia form four percent of its indig-
enous and temporary immigrant Muslim population of some 20 mil-
lion. Shia concentrations can be found in Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, 
Yekaterinburg and Derbent. As things stand now, a certain degree 
of sectarian polarisation in the wake of the Syrian War as well as 
targeted attacks against Shia people and Shia infrastructure by North 
Caucasian IS affiliates remain always possible. But scenarios of an 
imminent explosion of communal violence between the Sunni and 
Shia populations in Dagestan and between Sunni and Shia migrants 
in the large Russian cities are probably alarmism and threat inflation 
that is typical for certain international and domestic opinion mak-
ers, security analysts and region watchers. Instead, a number of other 
developments will prove crucial in shaping the nature and direction 
of Shi’ism in Russia.
To start with, the Shia Azerbaijani in Russia and certainly the 
temporary migrants and the communities in Dagestan who continue 
to interact directly with Azerbaijan and its society through various 
channels will, to different degrees, be influenced by the dynamics of 
Shi’ism and of religiosity in general in that country (see Balçi 2007 
and Wiktor-Mach 2017). Not in the least this comprises the growth 
of an actively religious population segment for which Shi’ism goes 
beyond the ethnic and that represents a substantial share of 17 to 
20 per cent of the population. Partly, the social teachings of Shi’ism 
thereby inform a reaction to the impact of globalisation and mod-
ernisation and against the injustices committed by oligarchies and 
state bureaucracies. There is also the move, both by state-affiliated 
and nonstate religious actors, to establish a specific Azerbaijani 
Shia-ness as a component of national identity, although interpreta-
tion and practices often radically differ between the protagonists 
involved.
Finally, Salafi and Hanafi Sunni proselytism among ‘ethnically 
Shia’ Azerbaijani populations will likely enhance a counter-reaction 
in the form of a stronger Shia consciousness. Another crucial develop-
ment is related to the sources of authority among Russia’s Ja’fari Shia. 
It is too easy to reduce Shia mobilisation and the reinvigorating of 
Shia consciousness in the former USSR to something merely related 
to Iranian backing. Iran is indeed the ‘beacon state’ and houses several 
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intellectual centres of the Shia realm, has a political system anchored 
in Shia political theology and internationally champions Shia causes, 
including in Russia, through the Ahl’i Beyt movement and a number 
of Hosseiniyya congregations (Lisnyansky 2009).
A Russian Shia Muftiate?
Direct Iranian influence is indeed palpable among Shia migrants from 
southern Azerbaijan. But there are other transnational channels at 
work as well, not in the least the movements of the marāji. These are 
clerics and religious guides, often with the rank of grand ayatollah, 
who have acquired a level of religious knowledge and credibility in the 
Ja’fari Shia intellectual elite that allows them to be a source of imita-
tion for the individual believer. Prominent marāji like Javad Tabrizi, 
Fasil Lenkorani (and those continuing their work after they passed 
away in 2006 and 2007 respectively), Ali al-Sistani and Nasr Makarem 
Shirazi have been acquiring a following among Shia in the former 
USSR since the 1990s. Often based in Iran and Iraq, they have their 
own campuses, resources, congregations, information channels and 
representation offices. These institutions treat individual religious, 
ethical and life questions; issue statements on political and gover-
nance that are not necessarily the official line of the Iranian state 
government; conduct charity work; distribute printed, audio-visual 
and digital literature; issue stipends for religious seminarians; send 
preachers and facilitate the Hajj and pilgrimages to Shia sites (see 
Arminjon 2012 and Filin 2013).
The different autonomous and semi-autonomous marāji move-
ments were and remain instrumental in reinvigorating Shia ideology 
in the vacuum left after the demise of the USSR. Pretty much like with 
Salafism, audio-visual information carriers, the internet and social 
media became important channels for the spread of Ja’fari Shi’ism, 
societal views informed by it and news and views from the wider Shia 
world. In terms of official Shia institutions, the only organ supervising 
Ja’fari Shia in the former USSR remains the 1944-founded, Baku-
based Spiritual Board for the Muslims of the Trans-Caucasus. Since 
it has been situated in a foreign country since 1991, the question is 
whether an official spiritual directorate and a muftiate for the Shia in 
Russia will be created, what ideological direction and autonomy it will 
have if it materialises and whether it can have the same intellectual 
authority as the Iranian and Iraqi marāji.
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Shifting beyond Ethnicity?
This question is all the more relevant, as Shi’ism, with its heterodox and 
mystic nature, is at times suggested to be an inalienable component of 
a Eurasian subsphere in the Islamic world, an objective ally in the tradi-
tionalist resistance against liberal globalism and an antidote against puri-
tanical Sunni persuasions like Salafism and Takfirism (for more on this 
idea, see De Cordier 2008). Contrary to historically strong Sufism, which 
made it out of the USSR experience fragmentised and often inordinately 
co-opted by power structures, Ja’fari Shi’ism has a political theology that 
is well developed and autonomously informed. It may be exactly this that 
explains the reluctance to establish a Russian Shia muftiate. For some 
time to come, the further development and direction of Ja’fari Shi’ism in 
the country will remain closely intertwined with that among the Azerbai-
jani population in the country as well as in Azerbaijan itself.
Simultaneously, it can move beyond that when some groups adopt 
Ja’fari Shi’ism out of dissatisfaction with the official or state-affiliated 
Sunni authorities or with the growing influence from the Persian-
Arab Gulf on Sunnism, as reportedly happens among some Tajik 
immigrants. The issue of conversions to Shi’ism among Tajik labour 
migrants in Russia was first reported to me by different interlocutors 
in the Vakhsh region in southern Tajikistan seven years ago. Despite 
the occasional hyperbolic statements about ‘massive numbers’ up to 
‘one-third’ popping up during informal conversations and on Sunni 
web portals, it seems to be rather a niche movement involving a few 
thousand, be it one well present on the mental map in society.
Another factor that may make Shi’ism attractive is its sacred prin-
ciple to exalt the downtrodden as well as its capacity to serve as a 
cultural affirmation for ethnic groups, like some small ethnicities 
in Dagestan, who face ethno-linguistic assimilation in larger Sunni 
groups. Depending on the motives and circumstances that brought 
and bring various individuals and groups to more actively professed 
Ja’fari Shi’ism, these can become the most active champions of its 
cause or of social movements inspired by this persuasion. As such, 
the Shia element in Russia might become more relevant and present 
than its low-profile minority state suggests.
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